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Abstract: Groundnut products are of central economic importance to millions of smallholders in 
Africa, India and Southern China. The products generate 60 percent of rural cash income and 
account for about 70 percent of the rural labor force in Senegal and Gambia. Groundnut trade 
remains, however, heavily distorted, and this has affected the competitive position of various 
players in world markets. Using a new partial-equilibrium, multi-market, international model, we 
analyze the trade and welfare impacts of several groundnut trade liberalization scenarios 
compared with the recent historical baseline. Net welfare is evaluated as the sum of consumers' 
equivalent variation, quasi-profits in farming, quasi-profits in crushing, and taxpayers’ revenues 
and outlays implied by distortions. We find that trade liberalization in groundnut markets has a 
strong South-South dimension with policies in India, and to a lesser extent China, heavily 
depressing the world prices of groundnuts at the expense of smaller developing countries mainly 
located in Africa. Under free trade, African exporters would gain because they are net sellers of 
groundnut products. In India, consumers would be better off with lower consumer prices 
resulting from the removal of prohibitive tariffs and large imports of groundnut products. The 
cost of adjustment would fall on Indian farmers and crushers. In China, crush margins would 
improve because of the large terms of trade effects in the oil market relative to the seed market. 
China’s groundnut product exports would expand dramatically. Net buyers of groundnut 
products in OECD countries would be worse off. We draw implications for the Doha 
negotiations. 
Keywords: Doha, groundnut, peanut, oil, trade liberalization, protection, distortion, negotiations 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
  World production of groundnuts stood at 34 million tons in 2001, accounting for 10 
percent of the world’s total oilseed production of 324 million tons
1. China is the world’s largest 
groundnut producer, with 40 percent of world’s production, followed by India (23 percent), a 
group of Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries (8.4 percent) and the United States (5.6 percent). 
Groundnuts provide a valuable source of protein, fats, energy, and minerals, and generate cash 
income to many poor farmers in the developing world, especially in SSA and Asia. In Senegal 
for instance, groundnut account for 70 percent of the rural labor force and 60 percent of 
households’ agricultural income. Groundnut production and processing represent about 2 percent 
of GDP and 9 percent of exports in that country.  
  Due to generally high level of self-consumption, international trade in groundnuts is thin: 
only 5 percent of world production is sold in the international markets. Of the three major 
groundnut products traded internationally (edible groundnuts, groundnut oil and groundnut 
meal), edible groundnuts are the most traded, with a volume of 1.2 million tons in 2001, against 
250,000 tons for groundnut oil. Further, the different groundnut products face different export 
dynamics in international markets. While global export of edible groundnuts increased by 2.2 
percent over the last 20 years, exports of groundnut oil and meal declined by 1 and 2.5 percent 
annually despite growing global consumption of these two products. 
  China is the world largest exporter of groundnut, with 32 percent of world edible 
groundnut exports, followed by the US (19 percent) and Argentina (10.5 percent). Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Senegal, Gambia, Nigeria, Malawi, South Africa and Sudan) has lost most ground in 
world edible groundnut markets, and collectively accounts for only 5 percent of the world 
market. In the groundnut oil market segment however, Senegal is the largest supplier, but this 
market has become all the more thinner as other vegetable oils are increasingly used as 
substitutes of groundnut oil.  
Since the mid 1990s, all major exporters have been gradually liberalizing their groundnut 
sectors, in part to fulfill their commitments under WTO agreements. However, the results are 
mixed and trade in groundnut products remains heavily distorted. Both China and India have 
removed some import restrictions and have allowed wider private sector participation in 
importing groundnuts. Still, tariffs on groundnut products remain very high in India and to a 
lesser extent in China. The market size of both countries exacerbates these distortions and their 
effects on the world market. In the US, the 2002 Farm Bill has suppressed many unsustainable 
features of the previous groundnut policies (e.g., the high support price and production quotas) 
but has introduced new distortions, such as counter-cyclical payments and the floor price 
mechanism. These policies would subsidize U.S. groundnut exports in situations of low world 
prices with a potential to depress world market prices. Argentina still selectively subsidizes some 
processed groundnut products and exports and applies moderate export taxes on groundnuts. In 
SSA the heavy producer taxation of earlier government intervention has ended, and unilateral 
liberalization efforts are continuing. Protection of processing remains significant however.  
                                                           
1 Groundnuts are also known as peanuts, earthnuts, goobers, pinders, and Manila nuts. The groundnut plant is a hairy, tap rooted, 
annual legume that measures 1 to 1.5 feet in height. Shelled groundnuts are basically used as seed, consumed as raw edible 
groundnuts or after transformation into “prepared” groundnuts (roasted, salted, flavored, etc.) or into groundnut butter/paste. 
They can also be crushed for oil and a by-product, groundnut meal (animal feed). Groundnut oil is an excellent quality cooking 
oil with a high smoke point (440 degree F) and neutral flavor and odor. It allows food to cook quickly with a crisp aspect and 
with little absorption.   5
  The current situation raises many important questions about the future of the sector and 
prospects for various players. How will multilateral groundnut trade liberalization affect the 
competitive positions of the various players? Which countries are likely to gain and capture 
larger market shares and which ones will lose? How will small SSA producers be affected? We 
address these questions in this paper.  
The next section examines the dynamics of global production, trade and prices of 
groundnut products. The third section reviews the groundnut policies of the major players in the 
groundnut market, with an emphasis on the most distortive policies. In the fourth section, we use 
a multi-market, partial-equilibrium model to assess the impact of removing major policy 
distortions on world prices, trade flows, and welfare for major producing and trading countries 
involved in the groundnut market. We analyze multiple scenarios. First, we consider full 
multilateral trade liberalization for groundnut products with and without the removal of the U.S. 
groundnut program. Then we consider multilateral groundnut trade liberalization, again with and 
without the removal of the U.S. farm groundnut program. Then we consider full trade 
liberalization in the two largest and most distorted groundnut markets, India and China. The last 
section derives the major policy implications of the study and concludes. 
 
II. GROUNDNUT PRODUCTION AND TRADE 
Groundnut Production, Cost, and Utilization 
 
  Groundnuts belong to the oilseeds category and account for 16 percent of world oilseed 
harvested area. The major producers are China, with 40 percent of world’s production, followed 
by India (23 percent), Sub-Saharan Africa (8.4 percent), the United States (5.6 percent) and, to a 
lesser degree, Japan (Table 1). 
Table 1. Groundnut production and utilization, average 1996-01 
 
  Groundnut production conditions vary considerably across countries, reflecting 
Area Domestic Net
Country harvested Yield Production Utilization Food use Crushed Feed/seed Export
(1000 ha) (mt/ha) (1000 mt) (1000 mt) (1000 mt) (1000 mt) (1000 mt) (1000 mt)
World 21452 1.4 29997 29896 12416 14590 2891 169
Main producers and exporters
China 4234 2.9 12204 11777 4753 6140 884 427
India 7902 0.9 7176 7082 534 5581 967 94
USA 569 3.0 1701 1428 978 280 170 220
Argentina 280 1.5 403 191 21 155 15 213
Main producers in Africa
Nigeria 1187 1.1 1340 1340 636 427 278 0
Senegal 690 1.1 722 730 317 304 109 -6
South Africa 98 1.7 161 123 72 32 19 33
Malawi 117 0.9 103 101 78 18 5 2
Gambia 89 1.0 95 80 26 54 0 15
Main importers
EU 1 1.0 1 454 433 17 5 -449
Canada 0 0.0 0 115 115 0 0 -115
Japan 12 2.3 28 129 121 2 6 -103
south Korea 7 2.2 15 30 30 0 0 -15
Source: USDA
Note: The difference between production + net exports and domestic utilization reflects stock variation, not shown here
Ending stocks are negligible for all country except the US fo which it stood at 28 percent of total production during 1996-01  6
differences in technological development, access to modern inputs and irrigation, and farm 
management practices. Table 1 shows large differences in yields across major producing 
countries. Groundnut yields are highest in the United States and China, and lowest in SSA 
(except South Africa) and India. Yet between the US and China, important differences exist in 
farm practices. While in the U.S. production is highly mechanized, the high yields in China 
reflect high labor-intensive farming practices in small plots of land and intensive use of draft 
animal (Colby et al. 1992). The low yields in Africa and India are the result of limited use of 
modern inputs including high-yielding seed varieties and high dependence of production upon 
rainfall.  
  Driven by a tremendous growth in China, global production of groundnuts exhibited a 
strong expansion between 1981 and 2000. Shelled groundnut production grew by 34 percent 
between 1981-85 and 1996-00. Growth in production has however been uneven across countries. 
As Figure 1 shows, production growth in China has been impressive, following Chinese 1978 
market reforms
2. This country doubled its production between 1992 and 2000. Groundnut 
production in India grew up from 1987 to 1998, before dropping to its 1970s level of 6 million 
tons in recent years. Indian production exhibited however important fluctuations throughout this 
whole period. Production in SSA picked up in the early 1990s, after a long period of decline. 
Groundnut production in the United States and Argentina stagnated around 2 million and 
300,000 metric tons respectively over the last three decades.  
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Source: Oil world. 
 
  Table 2 compares the economic cost per acre between the U.S. and China, the two 
countries of comparable yields and that account for about half of the world groundnut production 
                                                           
2 China took also advantage of increased use of high yield varieties (HYV) and agricultural inputs (fertilizers, pesticides, 
insecticides, mechanization, and irrigation) to boost yields and production (Colby et al. 1992).   7
and 50 percent of world’s edible groundnut export in 2001. Due to lack of more recent data, the 
comparison is done for the years 1992 and 1993. As Table 2 shows, economic costs per acre 
were more than three times higher in the US than in China in the early 1990s. Cost per acre in 
groundnut production stood at $694.03 on average for the United States, more than three times 
higher than the average cost for China, $164.45 per acre, in 1993.  
  The larger economic costs per acre for U.S. groundnuts were chiefly attributed to 
production quota rent, land value, and “other expenses” (i.e., costs of using and maintaining farm 
equipment, cost of fuel, electricity, repair, capital replacement). Quota rent and land value are 
not an effective cost for farmers in China, since there is no production quota as such in China, 
and land is considered as a public property, belonging to local communities organized in groups 
of 30-40 households (Chen et al. 1997)
3. Net returns between the U.S. and China were not 
significantly different if one excludes quota rent (irrelevant since the 2002 Farm Bill) in US 
production costs. US cost disadvantage is however compensated by higher producer prices 
brought about by the groundnut program and higher US quality groundnuts. The elimination of 
quota production (thus quota rent) in the 2002 Farm Bill reduces further US production costs. 
This development as well as the reputation of high quality groundnut producer warranting a high 




Table 2. Economic costs and returns in groundnuts, China and the U.S.  
(US$/acre, 1992 and 1993) 
 
  There has been a gradual increase in the use of groundnuts for food purposes, and a 
resulting decline in the share of groundnut production crushed for oil and meal over the last 20 
years  (Figure 2). The largest increase in food use occurred in developed countries and fast 
                                                           
3 Any growers in the group are eligible to farm a certain number of acres of land. Farmers who use the land are obligated, 
however, to pay agricultural tax in kind and sell a certain amount of their products to the state government at regulated prices 
(Chen et. 1997).   
4 Export markets display relatively high quality premiums/discounts depending upon quality reputation of exporters. Prices of 
groundnuts originated from the US set in fact a ceiling for international prices because the US export high quality groundnuts 
which command a relative high price premium in international markets. In 2000, edible U.S. groundnuts commanded a 40 
percent premium on world markets compared to shelled Chinese groundnuts, according to FAO trade data. 
US China US China
Variable costs:
70.32 43.83 71.18 45.96
43.27 25.03 42.40 26.13
89.70 3.40 92.57 3.68
89.14 71.51 86.17 75.86
212.84 41.43 188.54 12.82
505.27 185.20 480.86 164.45
92.58 97.77
113.38 115.40
711.23 185.20 694.03 164.45
2576 2520 1940 2135
753.66 323.69 570.58 280.83




    Subtotal
    Land value
    Quota rent
Total Costs:
    Fertilizer
    Chemicals
    Labor
    Other expenses
1992 1993
Item
    Seed  8
growing economies in Asia
5. In contrast, producers in India and most of SSA still devote more 
than 60 percent of their production to crushing for oil and meal. The overall declining use of 
groundnut for oil and meal reflects the increasing availability of cheaper, low-fat vegetable oils 
such as soybeans and rapeseeds, as substitutes. Similarly groundnut meal competes with meal 
from other oilseeds and with cereal-based products such as maize gluten.  
Source: Oil World. 
 
Global Trade and Market Shares Dynamics 
 
Among the different groundnut products, shelled edible groundnuts, prepared groundnuts 
and groundnut oil are the most traded products in international markets. Table 3 shows the trade 
balance of each of these products for the major countries involved in groundnut trading in 
groundnut markets in 1996-2000. Countries with net exports over US$100 million are China, 
Argentina, and the U.S. The bulk of these countries’ exports is constituted of edible groundnuts. 
India’s trade balance reached US$94 million while Senegal, the largest African net exporter in 
the period registered a US$53 million groundnut trade surplus. Ninety two percent of Senegalese 
net export was groundnut oil.  
The EU, Canada and Japan are the major edible groundnut markets. The EU is the 
world’s largest groundnuts market, accounting for 43 percent of world groundnut imports. EU’s 
total value of net groundnut imports was just below US$500 million in 1996-2000. The other 





                                                           
5  















































































Table 3. Value of net exports, by groundnut product, 1996-2000 
 
Figure 3 and 4 show the structure and trend of EU’s edible groundnut (Figure 3) and 
groundnut oil (Figure 4) imports. Competition among exporters in this market has increased. The 
US has lost share in the EU edible groundnuts market between 1996 and 2001 to Argentina, 
which has become the top exporter of that particular product in that market (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Competition in the EU edible groundnut market 
 Source: Oil World 
  
  Imports of groundnut oil are much more concentrated than that of edible groundnut, but 
here also, the EU represents a sizable block, with more than 60 percent of world imports for the 
1996-2000 period. Demand from the EU has declined overtime as cheaper vegetable oils were 
increasingly substituted for groundnut oil. As Figure 6 shows, even as EU’s demand for 
groundnut oils has increased substantially, groundnut oil lagged behind that of palm and 
rapeseed.   
 



























Edible Groundnut Groundnut Oil Prep.Groundnut Total
  China 193.79 2.82 111.06 307.68
  India 86.85 -0.13 7.27 93.99
  USA 126.43 -12.77 28.26 141.92
  Argentina 160.98 51.52 25.82 238.32
  Nigeria -3.29 4.64 0.00 1.35
  Senegal 3.34 48.99 0.60 52.92
  South Africa 16.01 4.68 0.27 20.95
  Malawi 0.77 0.00 0.00 0.77
  Gambia 4.49 1.09 0.05 5.63
 European Union (15) -378.47 -115.12 -4.54 -498.13
  Canada -76.67 -1.19 -3.31 -81.18
  Japan -44.00 -1.85 -71.46 -117.31
  Korea, Republic of -4.55 0.01 -14.31 -18.86
Source: FAOSTA, 2002
Note: Prepared groundnut = roasted, salted, flavored groundnuts. Peanut butter not included. 
Value of Net Exports in Million US $  10
 
Figure 4. EU’s import of groundnut oil versus palm and rapeseed oils 
 
  Figures 5a to 5f depict the trends in exports and market shares of raw edible groundnuts 
prepared groundnuts and groundnut oil since 1976. Consistent with growth in world 
consumption of raw edible and prepared groundnuts, export of these two products expanded 
rapidly since the mid-1980s. Exports of edible groundnut increased by 8 percent between the 
first and second half of 1990s. This growth followed a dramatic increase of over 20 percent over 
the 1980s. The pattern of growth in prepared groundnut export broadly mirrors that of edible 
groundnuts signaling the highly integrated nature of these markets as shown in Figure 5c.  
China has been the major beneficiary in the expansion of the groundnut markets while the 
U.S. role has decreased significantly. From barely 1 percent in 1976, China’s market share in the 
world edible groundnut market increased dramatically to 32 percent in 2001. During the same 
period, US’ market share dropped from 32 percent to 19 percent (Figure 5b). The emergence of 
China as a leading groundnut exporter is even more impressive in the prepared groundnut 
market. Other producers have increased their share from about 20 percent to 35 percent (Figure 
5d), also contributing to the erosion of the U.S. export market share.  
  While the international edible groundnut market has become more concentrated with 61 
percent of exports controlled by China, the US and Argentina in 2001, the market for prepared 
groundnuts has become more fragmented. The concentration of the edible market partially 
reflects the significant decrease in SSA’s share, from 17 percent to 5 percent. African shares 
have been quite volatile, as several African countries (including Nigeria, Malawi, and the 
Gambia) enter intermittently the edible export market depending on their crop quality and world 
market demand, and are not dependable suppliers in this market.  
  Over the last 25 years, many countries have exited the groundnut oil market (e.g., Brazil) 
or have chosen to enter it only when the quality of groundnut harvested cannot be sold in the 
edible market (e.g., United States). In this rather stagnant groundnut oil world market, Argentina 
and Senegal remain the world’s leading exporters but the market has significantly fragmented. In 
1976, Senegal, Argentina, Brazil, and the United States supplied 85 percent of total exports while 
in 2001, these four countries represented only 52 percent of total exports. China and Brazil 
experienced sharp decreases in shares as they elected to exit the groundnut oil market and shift 






































































































































Palm oil Groundnut oil Rapeseed oil  11
   
Figure 5. The world groundnut markets: exports by product and market shares  
Figure 5a. World export and “consumption” of raw edible 
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The decline in African country shares in world groundnut markets has significantly 
reduced the contribution of groundnut products in export earnings of many countries. As Table 4 
shows, the importance of groundnut products as a source of export earnings has declined 
dramatically in Senegal and South Africa and in Malawi since the early 1980’s. It has only 
increased in Gambia significantly in Gambia where it accounted for 84 percent of total good 
exports in 2000-02.   
Table 4 also depicts the changes in the volume and value of groundnut exports, for 
shelled (raw edible) groundnuts and groundnut oil. The volume exported of raw edible 
groundnuts decreased significantly in Malawi, Nigeria and South Africa and quasi-stagnated in 
Senegal and Gambia. As a result of declining and quasi-stagnant volumes, shelled groundnut 
export earnings dwindled, but the extent of the decline suggests that unit values have decreased 
for Malawi, Gambia and Senegal. This is confirmed in Figure 6. The export performance of 
groundnut oil is more contrasting. Senegal and Nigeria have increased both their volume and 
value of exports while South Africa significantly exited the groundnut oil market.  
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Senegal Argentina USA Brazil
Nigeria South Africa Senegal Gambia Malawi
Shelled gr.  export volume  1980-82 1,026 41,333 2,725 27,333 14,867
(metric ton) 2000-02 412 34,830 2,915 27,939 662
Shelled groundnut exports 1980-82 400 29,730 2,145 11,743 12,333
(1000 US$) 2000-02 204 22,875 1,371 5,763 436
Gr. oil export volume 1980-82 0 22,667 82,693 7,651 0
(metric ton) 2000-02 1,287 1,519 98,879 8,633 0
Groundnut oil exports 1980-82 0 14,071 60,285 6,400 0
(1000 US$) 2000-02 797 1,053 63,007 6,333 0
Share of gr. In total exports 1980-82 0.003 0.21 16.17 59.62 4.65
(%) 2000-02 0.006 0.08 8.16 84.64 0.10
Source: Production and groundnut exports data, FAOSTAT; Total good exports, WDI
Note: The share of groundnuts in total good exports inlude export of groundnut meal  13
The evolution of Africa’s edible groundnut exports prices has not been uniform across 
major African exporters. As Figure 6 shows, despite a decline in recent years, prices for South 
African groundnuts have held up on average at a high level since the mid-1980’s. In contrast, 
prices sharply declined for Gambia and, to a lesser degree, Senegal. The discount on the latter 
two countries’ prices reflect their lower groundnuts quality and stricter EU quality and technical 
standards. The EU has indeed become more demanding, both from a public health perspective 
(permissible level of aflatoxin)
6, and from a technical standpoint (size, uniformity).  
  
Figure 6. Unit value of raw edible groundnut of African origin (US$/ton) 
 
Groundnuts International Prices 
  International prices of edible groundnuts and groundnut oil in Rotterdam market (the 
reference for groundnut trade) exhibit two distinct patterns since 1970 (Figure 7). First, during 
1970-81, both prices were non-stationary, drifting away, and following an increasing trend. Co-
integration tests show no co-integration between edible groundnut and groundnut oil during this 
period (Annex Tables 1 to 3). Prices were high and the world market was dominated by the US 
and SSA which supplied respectively 45 and 18 percent of world exports. China exported no 
edible groundnut or groundnut oil.  
  Second, in sharp contrast with the 1970s, groundnut prices over the last 20 years have 
been stationary, constantly reverting to their mean values following shocks (Annex Tables 4&5). 
Price fluctuations were thus important but two sub-periods can be distinguished. Prior to 1994, 
prices of groundnuts displayed a higher level of volatility. The coefficient of variation of prices 
stood at 20 percent between 1980 and 1994 against only 7 percent between 1995 and 2001. This 
shift in world price variability warrants at least two questions. First, what are the main causes? 
Second, is the change in price variability permanent? 
                                                           
6 Aflatoxin is a cancer-causing chemical produced by species of aspergillus moulds that can contaminate 
groundnuts. The spores of these moulds, present anywhere in the air and the soil, require specific temperature, 
moisture and nutrient substrates to germinate. Aflatoxin contamination of groundnuts can occur during its 
cultivation in the field, as well as during harvesting, post-harvesting, storage and processing. While aflatoxin 










  South Africa  14
  Revoredo and Fletcher (2002) recently addressed theses specific questions. They analyze 
both production instability (originated in producer-exporting countries) and consumption 
instability (originated in consumer-importing countries) and find that steady expansion of 
Chinese exports, which are negatively correlated with exports from US and Argentina, have been 
a stabilizing force in the second half of the 1990s. This occurs in spite of the fact that India, 
Argentina, and South Africa now transmit a higher proportion of their supply shocks to the world 
market (Revoredo and Fletcher 2002). It seems therefore that substitution between Chinese and 
US groundnuts has increased in recent years, but detailed data on substitution in world markets 
to substantiate this inference is as yet inconclusive.  
  Regarding the groundnut oil market, the influence of Senegal on world prices remains 
significant. In 2000/01, Senegal exported about 100,000 metric tons of groundnut oil, 
representing one-third of the world’s export and more than 60 percent of demand from EU, 
Senegal’s main export market. While 2000/01 was an exceptional production year, Granger 
causality tests strongly indicate that variations in Senegal’s exports Granger-caused international 
prices and the reverse was not true (Table A6).  
 











  Finally as Figure A1 (Annex) shows, groundnut oil markets are broadly integrated with 
that of other vegetable oils (soy oil, rapeseed oil, palm oil, and sunflower oil), however, the 
integration between oilseeds markets other than groundnuts seems to be much stronger.  
 
III. DOMESTIC GROUNDNUT POLICIES OF MAJOR COUNTRIES IN WORLD MARKETS 
  This section reviews the groundnut policies of the US, China, India, Argentina and SSA. 
Since domestic producer support/taxation and trade policies essentially determine excess supply 
and trade flows, it is necessary to examine them in some detail to anticipate the potential 
implications of policy changes on the distribution of gains/losses across countries.  
Groundnut Policies in the United States 
  Groundnut products are a minor sector nationally, but they are a key component of 
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Census of Agriculture, many counties in the South derive 50-70 percent of their agriculture 
income from groundnut. The first level of value-added activities, such as shelling, are performed 
locally as are many groundnut products manufacturing (Fletcher 2001). Groundnut policies have 
played a major role in maintaining rural income in these regions of the US. 
  The foundation of U.S. groundnut policy is the U.S. peanut program, which traces its 
roots to the 1930s. Until the signature of the New Farm Bill in May 2002, the pillars of the 
system were production regulation through quotas, high producer support prices, and import 
control. The groundnut support program existed as a two-tier price support program. The support 
price for edible groundnuts was $610 per short ton paid for production under quota. Other 
groundnuts (“additionals”) could be either exported at world prices or sold to the domestic crush 
industry and were eligible for a lower support price ($132 in 2001). The quota farmgate price 
tended to be higher than the prevailing export prices as shown in Table 6.  
Table 6. Producer support prices and international prices 
Prices faced by peanut producers under former peanut programs (US cents/pound) 
Item  1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 
Quota  price  38.8 33.9 33.9 30.5 30.5 30.5 
Additional  price  6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 
Average  farm  price  30.4 28.9 29.3 28.1 28.3 28 
CCC  export  price  20 20 20 20 20 20 
Export  unit  value  33  28.6 29.2 32.2 32.7 32.8 
Rotterdam  c.i.f.  Price 37.1 29.2 33.6 31.6 36  29 
Source: Skinner (1999) 
  The domestic support as measured by the aggregate measure of support (AMS) for U.S. 
groundnuts was estimated at around $330 million during that year or $31 million more than the 
average AMS for 1996-2001. The average cost of aggregate support in 1996-01 stood at $206 
per metric ton of groundnut produced in the U.S. (Table 7).  
 
Table 7. U.S. aggregate measurement of support (million dollars) 
 
With the 2002 farm bill, groundnut production quotas were eliminated (with a quota 
buyout) and the groundnut price support program converted to a system of direct and counter-
cyclical payments, and a price floor cum production subsidy (non-recourse loans with marketing 
loan provisions). The key features of the new program are detailed as follows: 
(i)   All current groundnut producers have equal access to a marketing loan program, under 
which producers can pledge their crops as collateral to obtain a marketing loan rate equal to $355 
per short ton. Producers may repay the loan at a rate that is the lesser of USDA-set repayment 
rate plus interest or the marketing loan rate plus interest, or they can forfeit the loan. 
(ii)   For producers with a history of groundnut production, a new direct and fixed payment of 
1986-88 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1999-2000 2000-01
AMS Million US$ 347.2 414.6 299 305.76 300 330
AMS/ Metric Ton of US Production 203.3 264.1 180.0 190.5 172.7 222.8
Source: Skinner (1999), Hart and Babcock (2002) for 2000-01 AMS and USDA database for production data  16
$36 per ton is available. Historic producers are those involved in groundnut production during 
the period 1998-2001. Eligible production would equal the product of average yield in the base-
period and 85 percent of base-period acres. These payments are made regardless of current prices 
or the actual crop planted, so long as the farm remains in approved agricultural uses.  
(iii)   Producers with a history of groundnut production are also eligible for a new counter-
cyclical payment when market prices are below an established target price of $495 per ton minus 
the $36 per ton direct payment. The payment rate is the difference between the target price ($495 
per ton) minus the direct fixed payment ($36 per ton), and the higher of the 12-month national 
average market price for the marketing year for groundnut or the marketing assistance loan rate 
($355 per short ton). Total counter-cyclical payment to each eligible producer is calculated as the 
product of the payment acres (85 percent of base acres), the base-year average yield and the 
payment rate. 
(iv)    Owners of groundnut quota under the previous legislation receive compensation 
payments for the loss of quota asset value. Payments may be made in five annual installments of 
$220 per short ton during fiscal years 2002-06, or the quota owner may opt to take the 
outstanding payment due in a lump sum. These payments are based on the quota owner’s 2001 
quota, so long as the person owned a farm eligible groundnut quota (Wescott, Young, and Price 
2002).  
  Beginning in 1994, under the URAA and NAFTA, the U.S. opened its market to gradually 
increasing quantities of groundnut imports through a tariff-rate quota (TRQ) system. For edible 
groundnuts, the total TRQ in 2001 was 57,059 metric tons or 4 percent of domestic consumption, 
allocated to historical importers (e.g., Argentina 77 percent, Mexico 7.4 percent) and then on a 
first-come, first-serve basis (table 8). In-quota tariffs for edible and prepared groundnuts range 
between 6.6 to 9.35 cents per kilogram while out-of-the quota tariffs are very high, ranging 
between 131.8 percent and 163 percent under URAA (Table 9)
7.  
 
  Table.8. US edible groundnut TRQ allocation               Table 9. US over-the-quota tariffs 
 
                                                           
7 The levels of quota and tariff for the period post-2003 are currently under negotiation. 
Year Argentina Mexico Other Total
URAA TRQ NAFTA TRQ URAA TRQ NAFTA + URAA
1995 26,341 3,478 4,052 33,871
1996 29,853 3,582 5,043 38,478
1997 33,364 3,690 6,034 43,088
1998 36,877 3,801 7,024 47,702
1999 40,388 3,915 8,015 52,318
2000 43,901 4,032 9,005 56,938
2001 43,901 4,153 9,005 57,059
2002 43,901 4,278 9,005 57,184
-- 43,901 4,278 9,005 --
2008 43,901 unrestricted 9,005 --
Source: Uruguay Round Agricultural Negotiation, USA,
















Source: Uruguay Round Agricultural Negotiation, USA,
Revised Country Schedule and NAFTA
Note: Prepared groundnut = roasted, salted, flavored groun
NAFTA  17
Phase out of groundnut trade barriers under NAFTA and URAA is limited in scope, but it 
continues to have a dramatic impact on U.S. imports. From virtually no imports to the U.S. prior 
to 1994, edible groundnut imports have increased dramatically (Table 10). Argentina and Mexico 
averaged a fill rate of 87 and 77 percent respectively, but over-of-the quota imports were quite 
important, averaging 25,000 tons over the last six years. Edible groundnut imports comprised 6 
percent of U.S. total domestic consumption of groundnuts in 2001.  
 
  Table 10. US Imports of edible groundnuts 
 
The initial impacts of the new Farm bill are also visible here with the collapse of imports 
in 2003 (Table 10). The elimination of production quotas decreased the price paid by US 
processors and thus, increased domestic use of groundnuts (Figure 8). It also removed the 
incentive to import edible groundnuts.  
 











Groundnut Policies in India, China, and Argentina  
  For India, China and Argentina, a general trend since the mid-1990s is a gradual 
reduction of potentially market-distorting direct government intervention in production and 















year Import Quota Import Quota Import Quota Imports
1996 38270 29853 4710 3583 57000 38478 18522
1997 40622 33365 6148 3690 64000 43088 20912
1998 34465 36875 4834 3801 70000 47702 22298
1999 39494 40388 4916 3915 82000 52318 29682
2000 72230 43901 4864 4032 97000 56938 40062
2001 37557 43901 3611 4153 81000 57059 23941
2002 29927 43901 4406 4278 46795 57184 Not filled
2003 4692 43901 292 4278 5698 57184 Not filled
Source: USDA
Argentina Mexico  18
India has intensified its use of trade policy measures to protect its producers and processors. 
India is now the largest source of distortions in these product markets, but China is also a 
significant source of distortions in the groundnut oil market, because of its size relative to other 
countries present in these markets.  
  India removed most restrictions on domestic trade (inter-state), storage, and export of 
groundnuts by 1998, and permitted trading in groundnut futures. However, import tariff levels 
remain very high for all the three groundnut products considered here. As Table 12 shows, tariffs 
on edible groundnut and groundnut meal stood at 45 percent, while that of groundnut oil was 35 
percent in 2001. Since 2002, India has reversed its trade liberalization course on vegetable oil 
and has increased its applied tariffs on groundnut oil to 65-75 percent in 2002/3 and 85 percent 
for 2003/4 (Gulati, Pursell, and Mullen; and Pursell). The bound tariff is 100 percent. 
  Furthermore, additional regulatory burdens increase domestic costs and prices. One 
example is the obligation to sell and purchase groundnut only in the “Agricultural Produce 
Wholesale Market.”
8. Another example of costly legislation is the “small-scale reservation” 
policy in groundnut processing, which sets limits on fixed assets in plant and machinery and thus 
prevents the domestic processing industry from realizing economies of scale.  
  As in India, China liberalized groundnut trade to some degree in recent years. Imports of 
groundnut are now opened to private firms while prior to 1999, only six public agencies 
imported groundnut products. However, while the government has committed to cap and reduce 
trade-distorting domestic subsidies as part of its WTO accession commitments, guaranteed prices 
and government procurement schemes remained in place9. Furthermore, groundnut border 
protection remains high in China for processed groundnut (30%). The tariff on raw groundnut 
was only 15 percent in 2001 and many regions of China are natural exporters of groundnuts 
making the tariff redundant. In-quota tariffs on groundnut oil and groundnut meal were much 
lower, at 10 and 5.0 percent, respectively. One has however to factor in the issue of reported 
uneven application of the Chinese value-added tax (VAT) on imported and domestic products 
(USDA Attaché reports). The VAT is significant, ranging between 13 to 17 percent depending 
on the product; there is ample room for tax evasion (USDA FAS [a]; USDA FAS [b]), and the 
non-uniformity in application prevents a more accurate measure of the impact. Our policy 
analysis considers several cases with and without the VAT included in the trade barriers.  
  China’s State trading imposes quantitative restrictions through quotas and licenses on 
groundnut oil imports and imposes tariff barriers on seeds, meal, and oil. These barriers create a 
wedge between domestic and world market prices. Domestic prices of most oils including 
groundnut oil are significantly higher than international market prices. Tariffs and rents on 
import licenses explain price differentials between domestic and CIF prices. For example, the 
international price of groundnut oil in Hong Kong for 1998 was U.S. $728 per ton while the 
corresponding wholesale price in China was 67.8 percent higher (Fang and Beghin 2002).  
 
                                                           
8 This legislation is costly to both farmers and processors because even if they are located very close to each other 
geographically, they all have to travel to the wholesale market, pay an "agent commission" and other marketing fees 
before the transaction is processed. 
9According to FAO, these policies provide little incentive to expand production due to unattractive administrative price levels and 
greater involvement of private sector in marketing operations. Data on the size of domestic support is not available.   19
Table 13. Groundnut trade policies distortions in India, China and Argentina (%) 
 
  Argentina’s groundnut trade policy contrasts sharply with that of India and China, as 
almost all the distortions are associated with exports, with a 3.5 percent tax on exported raw 
groundnuts. With the peso devaluation of 2001, export retention on groundnut increased to 20 
percent. This export tax may countervail the positive signal sent to groundnut exporters through 
the peso devaluation. Argentina maintains import tariffs on groundnut products, which exhibit 
some escalation (5, 8 and 13 percent on edible groundnut, meal, and oil, respectively). These 
tariffs are frequently redundant since the country is a net exporter of groundnut products. 
  
Groundnut Policies of Key African Exporters 
  After decades of extensive intervention in the groundnut sector, African countries have, 
to a varying degree, undergone market reforms in the 1980s under structural adjustment plans 
(SAP). One of the main objectives of market reforms was to eliminate direct and indirect 
taxation of farmers that had undermined production incentives in the 1970s and early 1980s, and 
that led to underutilized processing capacities in many groundnut producing countries (Badiane 
and Kinteh 1994). Reforms have been piecemeal and partial. Governments have generally 
withdrawn from input markets, leading to difficult access to inputs (chiefly certified seeds and 
fertilizer) where important market failures (e.g., in the credit market) and high transaction costs 
prevailed, as in Senegal and Gambia (Akobundu 1998). Governments have however been 
reluctant to liberalize groundnut processing, for which privatization efforts started only recently 
(Senegal, Gambia). In Senegal and Gambia, producer prices are still set by governments.  
  African governments have traditionally used pricing policies as levers to conveniently tax 
or subsidize farmers based on countries’ industrial policy and political circumstances
10. Taxation 
of groundnut farmers was high in the 1970’s but has been reversed since the early 1990’s in most 
countries while real world prices have trended downward (Badiane and Kinteh 1994). In Senegal 
                                                           
10 Taxation of producers was direct, i.e., when marketing boards or similar agencies captured the rent equals to the difference 
between net world price and producer price, or indirect, via real exchange rate appreciation. This taxation was generally 
mitigated by input subsidies and border protection.  
Country Product Description 1999/2002
Edible groundnuts  Import tariff 45
India Groundnut oil Import tariff 35'
1
Groundnut meal Import tariff 45
Raw edible groundnuts  Import tariff 15
China Processed edible groundnut Import tariff 30
Groundnut oil Import tariff 10
Groundnut meal Import tariff 5
VAT on edible groundnuts and gr. oil VAT 17
Edible groundnuts  Import tariff 5
Groundnut oil Import tariff 13
Argentina Groundnut meal Import tariff 8
Edible groundnuts  Export tax 3.5
Groundnut meal Export rebate 3.2
groundnut oil (refined) Export rebate 2.3
Source: WTO, WITS. USDA GAINS Report 1.  Note: (1) India raised its tariff on oil to 65% in 2002 and 85% in 2003
Raw edib. gr. =raw, not roasted or cooked, in shell or shelled gr.
Processed groundnuts = Bleached, preserved or otherwise prepared gr., incl. Roasted, salted. gr. butter  20
and Gambia, the main rationale for state intervention in the groundnut sector has been to 
safeguard the viability of state-owned processing mills. Consequently, the share of the export 
price to groundnut farmers has consistently been less than 60 percent in these two countries. This 
policy has been counter-productive for the state-owned enterprises, since farmers have bypassed 
large public processing companies, creating excess capacities and financial difficulties.  
  With regard to trade policies, there are wide differences among African traditional 
groundnut exporters. Senegal and Malawi apply high tariffs on processed groundnuts, to 
encourage in-country processing (oil production in the case of Senegal) (Table 14). In contrast, 
Gambia and Nigeria have a liberal trade policy, with no export taxes or import tariffs. South 
Africa’s tariff structure exhibits a slight escalation, with processed groundnuts subject to a tariff 
of 6 percent while unprocessed groundnuts enter duty free. In Senegal and Gambia however, 
unofficial cross-border trade is significant, with farmers frequently crossing the border to and 
from Senegal, depending mainly on respective producer prices and domestic supply levels. Oil 
imports face a 20 percent tariff in Senegal, South Africa and Malawi. 
   
Table 14. Tariffs on groundnut products in major African producers (%) 
 
The EU has harmonized country regulations of maximum permissible level of aflatoxin 
in 1998, and has fixed maximum levels of aflatoxin to the lowest possible level (e.g., 0.002-
milligram for B1 type aflatoxin for edible groundnuts). Technical processes exist to reduce 
aflatoxin contamination (e.g., through ammoniac as used in Senegal for groundnut meal) but the 
best method is to improve farm practices through use of the best quality and resistant seeds, 
proper management of farms, and appropriate storage to avoid exposure to high temperature and 
humidity. African countries also face difficulties in meeting stricter product and quality 
standards. In Senegal and Gambia, groundnut varieties were originally selected for oil 
production, which can accommodate lower quality seeds and raw groundnuts. A seed variety in 
Malawi proved successful in better yields, but lacked commercially viable characteristics. These 
problems transpire in the international prices of African origin, which are discounted compared 
Country Product 1999/2002
Raw edible groundnut  5
Senegal Processed edible groundnut 20
Groundnut meal 0
groundnut oil (refined) 20
Edible groundnuts  0
Nigeria Groundnut meal 0
groundnut oil (refined) 0
Edible groundnuts  0
The Gambia Groundnut meal 0
groundnut oil (refined) 0
Raw edible groundnut  0
South Africa Processed edible groundnut 6
Groundnut meal 0
groundnut oil (refined) 20
Raw edible groundnut  5
Malawi Processed edible groundnut 25
Groundnut meal 0
groundnut oil (refined) 20
Source: WTO Database. Note: Raw edib. gr. =raw, not roasted or cooked, in shell or shelled gr.
Processed groundnuts = Bleached, preserved or otherwise prepared gr., incl. Roasted, salted. gr. butter  21
to high quality groundnut sold in the EU market (Figure 9).  
Source: Oil World 
    
  Shifting out of groundnut oil and upgrading the quality of edible groundnut may be an 
option for African producers. Unlike demand for oil and meal, demand for confectionary 
groundnut (the higher quality edible groundnut) has been rising and is expected to continue to 
increase in the medium term. At the same time, confectionary groundnuts receive a price 
premium that can be as high as 100 percent compared to grades used for oil and meal. In 
Senegal, one ton of first grade confectionery groundnut sells for $800 to $900, which is 
equivalent to the price of groundnut oil. It takes, however, three tons of unshelled groundnuts to 
produce one ton of oil. Similarly, prices of Gambian groundnuts are about $300, $450 and $600 
FOB for (crushing), bird food and edible respectively. Were Gambia able to upgrade 50 percent 
of its 10,000 tons of exports from crushing to edible, the increased revenue would be $1.5 
million. 
 
Groundnut Trade Policies of High-income Importers  
  In spite of a general pattern of tariff escalation, barriers to groundnut are not a major 
obstacle in high-income major importers: the two largest groundnut importers in this category, 
the EU and Canada, have a zero tariff for unprocessed groundnut and low processed groundnut 
tariffs for GSP and LDC countries (Table 15). Assessment of market access in these countries 
should however take into account the strict quality standards. In contrast to the EU and Canada, 
Japan and Korea have a high tariff regime for groundnuts. Japan applies a high tariff on 
processed groundnuts and it offers a very limited preference margin of 4 percent for groundnut 
exports from LDC. Korea has very high tariffs on both raw and processed groundnuts, with 
tariffs on the former standing at more than 200 percent. This high tariff on raw groundnut may 
reflect the government desire to stimulate production, which has plummeted over the past 15 
years. In contrast to edible groundnuts, groundnut oils and meal enter into all these high-income 
countries duty free. 
 
Figure 9. Prices of African Shelled Groundnut Exports Compared to other 







1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
SSA   Argentina   China   India  22
Table 15. Simple average tariffs on edible groundnuts, unprocessed and processed 
  
IV. IMPACT OF GROUNDNUT PRODUCT POLICY REFORMS ON WORLD PRICES, TRADE FLOWS 
AND WELFARE 
  We summarize key findings of our quantitative analysis of distortions in groundnut 
markets (see Beghin, Diop, Matthey, and Sewadeh 2003). A full description of the model and 
further details can be found in the latter reference. We first report results obtained under the most 
plausible assumptions underlying the model. We later discuss sensitivity analysis which concerns 
US policy and the uncertainty on China’s protection (VAT and protection of processed 
groundnuts). 
Policy Reform Scenarios 
  We analyze multiple scenarios. First, we consider full multilateral trade liberalization for 
groundnuts, meal, and oil, with and without the removal of the U.S. peanut program. We call 
these two scenarios FMTL&US, and FMTL. Then we consider multilateral groundnut trade 
liberalization, again with and without the removal of the U.S. farm peanut program (GMTL&US, 
and GMTL scenarios). We then consider full trade liberalization in the two largest and most 
distorted groundnut markets, China and India (CIFTL scenario). We report results on these key 
five scenarios in Tables 16 to 21. All results regarding changes in price and physical flows are 
reported in percent change from the baseline, Tables 16-20. Changes in welfare are reported in 
1995 PPP U.S. dollars (purchase power parity holding in 1995) in Table 21. The baseline and 
simulations were run for 3 years (1999-2001), and averaged. We report the 3-year average 
impacts in the last column of the tables. 
Results 
 In  countries  characterized  by high groundnut protection, the combined effect of the world 
price increase and removal of their own protection is beneficial to final users of groundnuts, 
other things being equal. For countries with moderate or no protection prior to reform, the net 
impact (tariff removal and terms of trade) is an increase in domestic groundnut prices, 
handicapping groundnut users (final consumers, crushers), other things being equal. A similar 
logic and dichotomy of cases carries through for groundnut oil and meal for which the combined 
effect of world price and tariff removal has to be assessed. These substantial terms-of-trade 
effects have a large impact on trade and welfare. Allocative efficiency gains in domestic markets 
can be offset by large price increases originating in post-reform world markets.  
  Further, in countries with high protection of the oil and/or meal sectors (e.g., India), the 
oil and cake tariff removal, net of the world price hike, induces lower domestic prices for these 
two products and reduces crush margins. As a result, the domestic excess supply of groundnut 
crushed into oil and cake decreases, drawing imports. By contrast, countries with moderate or no 
Unprocessed Processed Unprocesse Processed  Unprocesse Processed 
EU 0% 13% 0% 9% 0% 0%
Japan 3.7% 19% 3.7% 19% 3.7% 15%
Canada 0% 4% 0% 4% 0% 3.2%
Korea 243% 65% 243% 65% 243% 65%
Source: WTO
MFN Tariffs GSP Tariffs LDC Tariffs  23
protection in their oil and cake markets face a net price increase for oil and cake after full trade 
liberalization. Their final consumption of these value-added products decreases, and crushing 
increases as their crush margin improves with the reform. Their excess supply of these products 
increase and they exhibit larger exports. 
  The two full trade liberalizations scenarios with and without the removal of U.S. farm 
policy, FMTL&US and FMTL, bring strong price increases for all three products, 10 percent for 
groundnuts, 18 percent for groundnut cake, and 27 percent for groundnut oil, as shown in Tables 
16 and 17. The welfare impact of the FMTL&US and FMTL reforms is influenced by the change 
in the groundnut oil price, which affects the crush margin. Specifically, crush margins deteriorate 
in the EU and India, decreasing supply. However, margins improve in China, Gambia, Nigeria, 
Senegal, South Africa and the USA.  
  As shown in Tables 16 and 17, trade patterns change dramatically. China expands its 
exports of the three products. The high increase in the price of oil improves the crush margin and 
stimulates crush in China. Higher prices for groundnut oil in the world markets translates into 
larger exports. In India the lower crush margin reduces oil and meal production; lower consumer 
prices for all groundnut products stimulate oil and feed demand and eventually imports to meet 
the need associated with the liberalized price level. African producers expand their exports of 
value-added products. Senegal and Malawi decrease their exports of groundnuts because of 
larger domestic use, India experiences trade reversal becoming a large importer of groundnut oil 
and cake. Accounting for the trade reversals in Table 16 and 17, aggregate trade in groundnuts 
increases by 16 percent, and trade in value-added products more than doubles. 
  The first two columns of Table 21 show the welfare impact of these two reforms. The 
aggregate net welfare effects of FMTL&US and FMTL amount to about 791 million dollars at 
1995 prices in each scenario, respectively. China and India experience the largest welfare gains, 
not surprisingly since they have the two largest and most distorted groundnut product markets. 
China’s welfare gains are about 666 million dollars, whereas India’s’ gains are about 213 million 
dollars. The “moderate” world welfare effect first comes from offsets--some countries gain in 
aggregate whereas some others lose, chiefly the EU-15. Further, for many countries other than 
China and India, individual net gains/losses are moderate, mostly because of the small size of the 
three groundnut markets and their price-inelastic nature, which bring large transfers but small 
deadweight losses. Indeed, substantial transfers occur between consumers, crushers, and 
producers. These transfers offset each other.  
  Price effects induced by the reforms have a similar impact (large welfare rectangles and 
small triangles), including in countries with undistorted markets. For example in Nigeria, 
following FMTL, groundnut producers gain 34 million dollars of quasi-rents; consumers 
experience welfare losses of  65 million dollars because of higher oil and processed groundnut 
prices; crushers gain 51 million dollars; meal users (feed users) lose about 3 million dollars. The 
country in aggregate is better off by 16 million dollars.  
  Under multilateral trade liberalization for all three products, the removal of the U.S. 
program has impact on trade flows, terms of trade or welfare. The strong price effects of trade 
liberalization invalidate the price floor established by the U.S. loan rate. The only remaining 
production-distorting element is the fixed payment (fully coupled in our model), which is small. 
Results under both scenarios (full trade liberalization, FMTL) and FMTL&US) are qualitatively 
identical, except for the USA, which experience additional welfare gains of 3.5 million dollars 
for the removal of its domestic distortions (gains to U.S. taxpayers net of losses of U.S.   24
producers). The world price impacts of the FMTL scenario are identical to those of FMTL&US 
(10%, 18% and 27% respectively for groundnuts, cake and oil). Similarly trade flows are barely 
affected by the removal of the US domestic program under free trade. U.S. peanut exports are 
about 15,000 mt lower in the FMTL&US scenario as compared to their level in the FMTL 
scenario. Given that our parameterization of US farm policy assumes full coupling of payments 
received by producers to production, our assessment provides an upper bound on the effect of the 
current U.S. peanut program.
11 
  Many debates of the Doha round of the WTO revolve around narrow agricultural 
negotiations of substantial importance to developing countries. Hence, it is useful to assess what 
a narrow agricultural liberalization would achieve relative to a full trade liberalization 
encompassing the value-added products of groundnut oil and cake. The GMTL&US, and GMTL 
scenarios consider these reforms and their impacts, with results shown in Tables 18 and 19 and 
in the third and fourth columns of Table 21. Much is achieved by groundnut trade liberalization 
alone, but with a large second-best component since distortions are present in the value-added 
markets. In these groundnut liberalization scenarios, the price of cake and oil is little affected and 
crush margins are primarily affected by changes in groundnut prices. Margins improve in India, 
but deteriorate in countries with limited groundnut distortions. Consumer welfare implications 
are also different in these trade scenarios. In highly protected groundnut oil markets, prices are 
higher under the groundnut trade scenarios (GMTL scenarios) than they are under all-product 
trade liberalization (FMTL scenarios). In countries with no oil distortions, prices roughly remain 
as their baseline level and consumers do better under the groundnut trade liberalization than 
under FMTL scenarios. For the latter reason, the rest of the world fares much better under 
GMTL scenarios than under the FMTL scenarios.  
  By contrast African economies do much better with the FMTL scenarios than with 
groundnut trade liberalization reforms. The potential Africa-5 welfare gains nearly double 
moving from GMTL scenarios to FMTL ones.
12 
  If China and India liberalized alone (CIFTL scenario), the qualitative results of the FMTL 
scenarios would hold. What is striking in this last scenario is the importance of India’s and to a 
lesser extent China’s distortions and market size in the welfare, trade, and price effects. As 
suggested by Table 18 and the last column of Table 20, FMTL really hinges on the removal of 
distortions in China and India. With the implementation of CIFTL, world price increases for the 
three products would be substantial: 8 percent for groundnuts, 18 percent for meal, and 26 
percent for oil. The major welfare differences occur in the Rest of the World where consumers 
do worse than they would under the GMTL, since oil prices are higher. Africa-5 improves its lot 
in aggregate but not as well as it would under the FMTL scenario, since groundnut prices are not 
as high and because Africa-5 own distortions are still in place. 
                                                           
11 We also ran a U.S. distortion removal scenario under existing trade distortions. We obtain a 0.13% increase in the world price 
of peanuts and virtually no increase in world cake and oil prices. U.S. peanut exports decrease by 10 percent or about 20,000 mt. 
Hence unlike in the case of some other commodities subsidized by U.S. taxpayers and consumers (e.g., rice, cotton, sugar), the 
impact of the current U.S. farm program on peanut world price and trade is nearly negligible. 
12 Africa-5 denotes our aggregate of the Gambia, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa.   25
Table 16. Full trade liberalization and removal of US farm policy (FMTL&US scenario)
new levels after reform baseline levels average change
99/00 00/01 01/02 99/00 00/01 01/02 for 3 years
Peanuts Trade (1000mt)
Net Exporters
Argentina 241 190 196 226 177 185 7%
China 699 659 687 540 450 525 36%
Gambia 9 12 17 8 11 15 11%
India 89 -1 33 100 100 125 -62%
M a l a w i 011233- 8 0 %
Nigeria 30 39 42 0 0 0 3667%
Senegal -5 -10 -3 2 4 5 -287%
South Africa 26 20 38 20 16 35 22%
USA 272 162 234 255 141 231 8%
Total Net Exports 1361 1072 1245 1153 902 1124 16%
Net Importers
Canada 111 102 105 116 107 110 -5%
European Union 441 428 448 457 441 463 -3%
Mexico 94 65 69 101 72 75 -8%
Rest of the World 525 467 563 290 272 415 63%
Residual 189 10 61 189 10 61 0%
Total Net Imports 1361 1072 1245 1153 902 1124 16%
Peanuts Price US Run. 40/50 CIF Rotterd 896 972 779 820 888 700 10%
Peanut Meal Trade (1000 mt)
Net Exporters
A r g e n t i n a 7 35 46 36 75 05 2 1 3 %
China 111 119 124 9 15 25 741%
Gambia 7 12 11 5 10 10 22%
India -311 -297 -212 10 20 100 -1702%
M a l a w i 000000 9 %
Nigeria 26 26 34 0 0 0 2867%
Senegal 137 151 145 130 144 140 5%
South Africa -4 2 1 -5 0 0 95%
USA 33 29 31 6 5 5 484%
Rest of the World 134 136 103 8 14 -12 499%
Total Net Exports 206 233 300 230 258 320 -9%
Net Importers
European Union 162 169 158 186 194 178 -12%
Residual 44 64 142 44 64 142 0%
Total Net Imports 206 233 300 230 258 320 -9%
Meal Price 48/50% CIF Rotterdam $/mt 144 159 147 122 134 125 18%
Peanut Oil Trade (1000 mt)
Net Exporters
A r g e n t i n a 4 94 45 04 64 14 2 1 1 %
China 55 64 76 0 5 2 3469%
Gambia 5 6 6 0 0 0 589%
India -238 -225 -266 0 0 0 -24288%
M a l a w i 0010004 3 %
Nigeria 72 72 77 35 35 30 123%
Senegal 102 108 114 98 102 109 5%
South Africa 0 1 1 0 0 0 49%
USA 23 -18 6 2 -30 -10 288%
Rest of the World 114 103 105 18 11 8 861%
Total Net Exports 185 155 170 199 164 181 -6%
Net Importers
European Union 136 101 109 150 110 120 -9%
R e s i d u a l 4 95 46 14 95 46 1 0 %
Total Net Imports 185 155 170 199 164 181 -6%
Peanut Oil Price CIF Rotterdam $/mt 933 866 851 744 685 659 27%
welfare(million dollars) 690 920 763 791  26
Table 17. Full trade liberalization (FMTL scenario)
new levels after reform baseline levels
99/00 00/01 01/02 99/00 00/01 01/02 average change
for 3 years (%)
Peanuts Trade (1000 mt)
Net Exporters
Argentina 241 190 195 226 177 185 6%
China 693 655 678 540 450 525 34%
Gambia 9 12 17 8 11 15 11%
India 87 -1 29 100 100 125 -64%
Malawi 0 112 33 - 8 2 %
Nigeria 29 38 40 0 0 0 3564%
Senegal -6 -10 -4 2 4 5 -298%
South Africa 26 20 38 20 16 35 22%
USA 287 169 259 255 141 231 15%
Total Net Exports 1367 1075 1254 1153 902 1124 16%
Net Importers
Canada 111 102 105 116 107 110 -5%
European Union 442 428 448 457 441 463 -3%
Mexico 94 65 69 101 72 75 -8%
Rest of the World 531 470 571 290 272 415 65%
Residual 189 10 61 189 10 61 0%
Total Net Imports 1367 1075 1254 1153 902 1124 16%
Peanuts Price US Run. 40/50, CIF Ro 895 972 778 820 888 700 10%
Peanut Meal Trade (1000 mt)
Net Exporters
Argentina 73 54 63 67 50 52 13%
China 111 119 123 9 15 25 739%
Gambia 7 12 1 151 0 10 21%
India -311 -297 -212 10 20 100 -1703%
Malawi 0 0 0 0 0 0 8%
Nigeria 26 26 34 0 0 0 2862%
Senegal 137 151 145 130 144 140 5%
South Africa -4 2 1- 50 0 95%
USA 33 29 32 6 5 5 487%
Rest of the World 135 137 103 8 14 -12 499%
Total Net Exports 206 233 300 230 258 320 -9%
Net Importers
European Union 162 169 158 186 194 178 -12%
Residual 44 64 142 44 64 142 0%
Total Net Imports 206 233 300 230 258 320 -9%
Meal Price 48/50% CIF Rotterdam $/ 144 159 147 122 134 125 18%
Peanut Oil Trade (1000 mt)
Net Exporters
Argentina 49 44 50 46 41 42 11%
China 55 64 76 0 5 2 3459%
Gambia 5 6 6 0 0 0 587%
India -238 -225 -266 0 0 0 -24304%
Malawi 0 0 1 0 0 0 43%
Nigeria 72 72 77 35 35 30 123%
Senegal 102 108 114 98 102 109 5%
South Africa 0 110 0 0 49%
USA 24 -17 6 2 -30 -10 290%
Rest of the World 115 103 105 18 11 8 864%
Total Net Exports 185 155 170 199 164 181 -6%
Net Importers
European Union 136 101 109 150 110 120 -9%
Residual 49 54 61 49 54 61 0%
Total Net Imports 185 155 170 199 164 181 -6%
Peanut Oil Price CIF Rotterdam $/mt 933 866 851 744 685 659 27%
welfare(million dollars) 691 924 757 791  27
Table 18. Peanut trade liberalization and removal of US peanut program (GMTL&US scenario)
new levels after reform baseline levels
99/00 00/01 01/02 99/00 00/01 01/02 average change
for 3 years
Peanuts Trade (1000 mt)
Net Exporters
Argentina 260 208 249 226 177 185 22%
China 748 703 688 540 450 525 42%
Gambia 11 15 18 8 11 15 31%
India -482 -553 -415 100 100 125 -556%
Malawi -1 1 1 2 3 3 -93%
Nigeria 68 75 82 0 0 0 7470%
Senegal 4 222 4 5- 8 %
South Africa 25 20 38 20 16 35 20%
USA 355 244 301 255 141 231 48%
Total Net Exports 989 714 962 1153 902 1124 -17%
Net Importers
Canada 112 102 106 116 107 110 -4%
European Union 440 426 449 457 441 463 -3%
Mexico 95 66 70 101 72 75 -7%
Rest of the World 153 109 275 290 272 415 -47%
Residual 189 10 61 189 10 61 0%
Total Net Imports 989 714 962 1153 902 1124 -17%
Peanuts Price US Run. 40/50, CIF Rotterdam  884 960 759 820 888 700 8%
Peanut Meal Trade (1000 mt)
Net Exporters
Argentina 64 47 47 67 50 52 -6%
China -11 -9 12 9 15 25 -144%
Gambia 5 10 10 5 10 10 -2%
India 71 95 151 10 20 100 344%
Malawi 0 0 0 0 0 0 1%
Nigeria -2 -2 -2 0 0 0 -193%
Senegal 129 143 140 130 144 140 -1%
South Africa -5 0 0 -5 0 0 -7%
USA -14 -18 -13 6 5 5 -380%
Rest of the World -7 -5 -25 8 14 -12 -70%
Total Net Exports 231 260 320 230 258 320 0%
Net Importers
European Union 187 196 178 186 194 178 1%
Residual 44 64 142 44 64 142 0%
Total Net Imports 231 260 320 230 258 320 0%
Peanut Meal Price 48/50% CIF Rotterdam 122 133 125 122 134 125 0%
Peanut Oil Trade (1000 mt)
Net Exporters
Argentina 44 39 38 46 41 42 -6%
China -13 -11 -7 0 5 2 -705%
Gambia 0 0 0 0 0 0 -5%
India 45 55 38 0 0 0 4591%
Malawi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Nigeria 33 32 28 35 35 30 -6%
Senegal 97 101 109 98 102 109 -1%
South Africa 0 0 0 0 0 0 -4%
USA -14 -48 -24 2- 3 0 -10 -194%
Rest of the World 7- 3 - 21 81 1 8 - 1 0 3 %
Total Net Exports 200 165 181 199 164 181 0%
Net Importers
European Union 151 111 120 150 110 120 0%
Residual 49 54 61 49 54 61 0%
Total Net Imports 200 165 181 199 164 181 0%
Peanut Oil Price CIF Rotterdam $/mt 747 686 664 744 685 659 0%
welfare (million dollars) 782 1024 799 868    28
Table 19. Impact of peanut trade liberalization (GMTL scenario)
new levels after reform baseline levels average change
99/00 00/01 01/02 99/00 00/01 01/02 for 3 years
Peanuts Trade
Net Exporters
Argentina 260 208 248 226 177 185 22%
China 742 699 678 540 450 525 41%
Gambia 11 15 18 8 11 15 30%
India -483 -554 -419 100 100 125 -557%
Malawi -0.6 0.7 0.6 2 3 3 -95%
Nigeria 67 74 80 0 0 0 7358%
Senegal 3 22 2 4 5 -20%
South Africa 25 20 37 20 16 35 20%
USA 371 253 327 255 141 231 55%
Total Net Exports 995 717 972 1,153 902 1,124 -16%
Net Importers
Canada 112 102 106 116 107 110 -4%
European Union 440 426 449 457 441 463 -3%
Mexico 95 66 70 101 72 75 -7%
Rest of the World 159 112 285 290 272 415 -45%
Residual 189 10 61 189 10 61 0%
Total Net Imports 995 717 972 1,153 902 1,124 -16%
Peanuts Price: US Runners 40/50, CIF Rotterdam 883 959 758 820 888 700 8%
Peanut Meal Trade
Net Exporters
Argentina 64.42 46.98 47.23 67.00 50.00 52.00 -6%
China -10.71 -9.49 11.42 9.00 15.00 25.00 -146%
Gambia 4.87 9.81 9.92 5.00 10.00 10.00 -2%
India 70.15 94.53 150.54 10.00 20.00 100.00 342%
Malawi 0.00 -0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 1%
Nigeria -1.89 -2.37 -1.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 -196%
Senegal 129.18 142.68 139.58 130.00 144.00 140.00 -1%
South Africa -5.09 -0.19 -0.05 -5.00 0.00 0.00 -7%
USA -13.70 -17.66 -12.35 6.00 5.00 5.00 -376%
Rest of the World -6.06 -4.64 -24.20 8.00 14.00 -12.00 -69%
Total Net Exports 231.18 259.63 320.50 230.00 258.00 320.00 0.4%
Net Importers
European Union 187 196 179 186 194 178 1%
Residual 44 64 142 44 64 142 0%
Total Net Imports 231 260 321 230 258 320 0%
Peanut Meal Price: 48/50% CIF Rotterdam 122 133 125 122 134 125 0%
Peanut Oil Trade
Net Exporters
Argentina 44 39 38 46 41 42 -6%
China -13 -12 -7 0 5 2 -713%
Gambia -0.07 -0.16 0.04 0 0 0 -6%
India 44 55 38 0 0 0 4558%
Malawi -0.006 -0.027 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.000 0%
Nigeria 33 32 28 35 35 30 -6%
Senegal 97 101 109 98 102 109 -1%
South Africa 0 0 0 0 0 0 -4%
USA -13 -48 -23 2 -30 -10 -192%
Rest of the World 8- 3- 1 1 8 1 1 8 - 9 9 %
Total Net Exports 200 165 181 199 164 181 0%
Net Importers
European Union 151 111 120 150 110 120 0%
Residual 49 54 61 49 54 61 0%
Total Net Imports 200 165 181 199 164 181 0%
Peanut Oil Price: CIF Rotterdam 746 686 664 744 685 659 0%
Welfare (million dollars) 783 1,028 795 869  29
Table 20. Impact of China and India full liberalization (CIFTL scenario)
New levels after reform baseline levels average change
1999/2000 2000/01 2001/02 1999/2000 2000/01 2001/02 for 3 years (%)
Peanuts Trade
Net Exporters
Argentina 223 174 160 226 177 185 -6%
China 586 531 589 540 450 525 13%
Gambia 8 11 16 81 11 5 3 %
India 55 -38 0 100 100 125 -94%
Malawi 4 5 5 2 3 3 84%
Nigeria 12 19 22 0 0 0 1776%
Senegal -24 -19 -9 2 4 5 -708%
South Africa 24 19 37 20 16 35 14%
USA 258 142 238 255 141 231 2%
Total Net Exports 1147 845 1058 1153 902 1124 -4%
Net Importers
Canada 112 103 106 116 107 110 -4%
European Union 448 433 453 457 441 463 -2%
Mexico 96 67 70 101 72 75 -6%
Rest of the World 302 232 369 290 272 415 -7%
Residual 189 10 61 189 10 61 0%
Total Net Imports 1147 845 1058 1153 902 1124 -4%
Peanuts Price US Run. 40/50, CIF Rotterdam $/mt 877 952 763 820 888 700 8%
Peanut Meal Trade
Net Exporters
A r g e n t i n a 7 65 76 76 75 0 52 18%
China 114 122 126 91 5 25 759%
Gambia 7 12 11 5 10 10 22%
India -309 -294 -210 10 20 100 -1690%
Malawi 1 0 0 0 0 0 46%
Nigeria 26 26 34 0 0 0 2867%
Senegal 150 165 155 130 144 140 14%
South Africa -3 3 2 -5 0 0 139%
USA 37 33 35 6 5 5 563%
Rest of the World 108 108 80 81 4 -12 385%
Total Net Exports 205 233 300 230 258 320 -9%
Net Importers
European Union 161 169 158 186 194 178 -13%
Residual 44 64 142 44 64 142 0%
Total Net Imports 205 233 300 230 258 320 -9%
Meal Price 48/50% CIF Rotterdam $/mt 144 159 147 122 134 125 18%
Peanut Oil Trade
Net Exporters
Argentina 51 45 53 46 41 42 16%
China 53 61 74 0 5 2 3354%
Gambia 5 6 6 0 0 0 567%
India -240 -226 -269 0 0 0 -24481%
Malawi 2 2 2 0 0 0 185%
Nigeria 71 71 76 35 35 30 120%
Senegal 116 126 126 98 102 109 19%
South Africa 2 2 2 0 0 0 224%
USA 26 -14 9 2 -30 -10 326%
Rest of the World 92 79 85 18 11 8 665%
Total Net Exports 180 151 166 199 164 181 -8%
Net Importers
European Union 131 97 105 150 110 120 -12%
Residual 49 54 61 49 54 61 0%
Total Net Imports 180 151 166 199 164 181 -8%
Peanut Oil Price CIF Rotterdam $/mt 924 857 844 744 685 659 26%
Welfare effects (million $) 765 1013 815 - - - 864    30
Table 21. Welfare effects of policy scenarios in million dollars at 1995 prices (average 1999-2001)
Country FMTL&US FMTL GMTL&US GMTL CIFTL
Argentina 16.07 15.94 9.97 9.84 12.66
EU-15 -51.83 -51.27 -34.40 -33.82 -58.87
China 666.25 668.76 650.65 653.33 716.25
India 213.27 214.11 196.57 197.79 228.59
Rest of the world -126.69 -127.06 -4.21 -4.86 -71.06
Canada -5.94 -5.87 -4.88 -4.81 -4.59
Mexico -7.43 -7.34 -6.11 -6.01 -5.73
Senegal 41.03 40.96 21.93 21.86 21.39
Nigeria 15.93 15.77 7.22 7.07 13.45
South Africa 2.30 2.28 2.19 2.17 0.53
Malawi 7.45 7.45 7.60 7.61 -1.06
Gambia 0.43 0.42 0.24 0.24 0.36
USA 20.18 16.70 21.71 18.40 12.39
Africa-5 total
1 67.14 66.89 39.18 38.95 34.67
Total 791.01 790.87 868.48 868.79 864.32
1. Denotes the aggregate of Senegal, Nigeria, South Africa, Malawi, and the Gambia.
 
  We investigated two key assumptions in the model: the prevailing groundnut market 
price underlying the US market, and the level of protection of the groundnut markets in China. 
We calibrated the model on 2002/3 US prices ($389/mt) to see if the new US policy would have 
had a stronger impact on the world market under lower prevailing prices. US farm prices in 
2002/3 were 25 percent lower than in 2001/2. We remove the loan rate, counter-cyclical 
payments, and fixed payments (recall the latter two components are assumed fully coupled in our 
model to provide an upper bound on the effect of the US program), while holding all other 
distortions in place in all other countries. The price floor provided by the loan rate is effective 
under the lower 2002/3 farm price. US Output decreases by 7 percent under the new prices and 
US exports decreases by 52%, inducing a 0.9 percent increase in the world price of groundnuts 
and further negligible price impacts in the other markets.  The aggregate net welfare effect is 
negligible and negative. Higher world prices exacerbate distortions in other markets or increase 
import costs in net-importing countries. The US gains about 22 million dollars (program cost 
savings net of the producer loss).  We also tested the same change but with all other distortions 
removed in all countries (FMTL&US scenario). In this scenario, the world price levels of 
groundnuts was 0.5 percent higher than under free trade cum U.S. farm bill.  We concluded that 
removing the farm bill incentives in a free trade world would decrease US production by about 4 
percent and decrease its exports by 31 percent. The aggregate welfare gains vary by less than $1 
million. Hence, the conclusions that the new US groundnut policy is much more benign than its 
predecessor remains unaltered under much lower prices. 
  The sensitivity analysis on China’s protection structure is more pivotal to the conclusions 
reached, especially the protection of the groundnut sector. We consider the following 
assumptions changes: the protection of groundnut producers is assumed to be 15 (tariff is 
redundant in the original model). The Chinese farm sector is no longer assumed to be a net 
exporter without assistance. Under this new assumption and following full trade liberalization 
(FMTL&US), China becomes a net importer of groundnuts because demands for edible and 
crush groundnuts increase. China’s welfare gains are 1,029 million dollars. Aggregate welfare 
gains are 1160 million dollars. World prices increase by 18, 19, 29 percent for groundnuts, cake   31
and oil, respectively. We also lower the baseline protection of processed groundnuts to 15 
percent ad-valorem tariff (original tariff was 30 percent and VAT was 17 percent). Under the 
latter assumptions, welfare gains from FMTL in China are only 266 million dollars and 
aggregate gains are 388 millions. The world price of groundnuts increases by 9 percent in this 
modified scenario compared to a 10 percent increase under the original run). The major change 
in welfare occurs in China because Chinese consumers gain much less from trade liberalization 
compared to the initial situation with original tariffs and VAT on processed groundnuts.  
  
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
  The groundnut market is historically distorted by heavy government intervention in the 
North and the South. In the US, the 2002 Farm Bill has suppressed some unsustainable features 
of the previous policies, but has introduced new distortions with some limited potential to 
depress world market prices and subsidize U.S. groundnut exports. In India and China, 
governments have succeeded in stimulating production and exports, thereby capturing a growing 
share of the international market. These gains in India have been artificial because the entire 
groundnut industry relies on heavy protection. In contrast, in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and in 
Argentina, government intervention has negatively affected the sector.  
  Following full trade liberalization, world market prices would increase by about 10 
percent for groundnuts, 18 percent for meal, and 27 percent for oil. Trade in groundnuts would 
increase by 16 percent and trade in oil and meal would more than double, considerably 
expanding the global trade volume of these markets. 
  The current U.S. domestic peanut program is now mostly a U.S. domestic support 
program with minimal distortive impact, unlike U.S. domestic policy for other products such as 
cotton, dairy, rice, and sugar. Based on our scenarios, developing countries would gain little by 
“forcing” further U.S. groundnut policy reform. These changes would prove ineffective unless 
groundnut prices fall to very low levels. Only then would the U.S. policy further destabilize 
world prices given its anti-cyclical nature, and sending the wrong market signal to U.S. 
producers. Under prevailing market conditions, U.S. producers would actually benefit from 
multilateral trade liberalization in groundnut product markets. Hence, on the instance of 
groundnuts, it would be rational for the U.S. to support foreign groundnut producers in their 
attempt to liberalize. As a bloc, the most OECD countries would experience welfare losses after 
trade liberalization--moderate gains in the USA offset by losses in the EU-15, Canada and 
Mexico. Mexico, Canada, and the EU-15 would lose from the trade liberalization, because there 
are few distortions in these markets, so consumers are directly penalized by price increases for 
the groundnut products.  
  The removal of trade distortions by the two largest developing economies--India and to a 
lesser extent China-- is essential in the groundnut product markets. These two countries’ policies 
have the largest distorting effect on world prices for the three traded commodities considered in 
our analysis because of their market size and because of prohibitive distortions in the case of 
India. Their policies substantially depress the world prices of the three traded commodities. 
Following the removal of these distortions, net buyers of these products will be worse off. 
However, as we have shown, the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa that export groundnuts would 
mostly gain from full trade liberalization.  
  Although the net world welfare effects of liberalizing these three markets are moderate,   32
they remain significant for small agrarian economies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Hence in the 
context of poverty alleviation, liberalization creates welfare gains in countries where they are 
much needed.  
  The simulations also show that beyond agricultural trade liberalization, the liberalization 
of the value-added markets is essential to achieve larger welfare gains in African countries. 
Although the bulk of the world welfare gains occur with groundnut trade liberalization, the 
additional removal of distortions in value-added markets doubles net welfare gains in the African 
region via larger profits to groundnut and groundnut oil producers and exporters. African 
countries modeled in our trade liberalization analysis would experience aggregate welfare gains 
of 67 million dollars, with Senegal and Nigeria reaping most of these gains. Groundnut and 
groundnut oil consumers in Africa tend to be urban whereas groundnut production generates 
income in rural areas as a cash crop. In that respect, African groundnut producers modeled in our 
analysis gain between 50 and 150 million dollars of farm income depending on assumptions 
underlying the model. These figures are significant in the context of small African economies, 
and represent a significant opportunity to expand rural development in these areas. Also, in 
scenarios tested, the rest of the world would fare worse under full trade liberalization because 
consumers are required to pay higher groundnut product prices. However, groundnut is not 
without substitutes.  
    The recent changes present both challenges and opportunities to major countries 
in the market. The US is likely to continue to dominate the high end of the international 
confectionary market under the new program. The performance of China and Argentina show 
that both countries have established strong groundnut sectors that can compete favorably under 
free market conditions. Chinese exports have played a stabilizing role in world markets in the 
1990s. 
  All developing countries, except Argentina, face a quality challenge for meeting the 
requirements of the expanding confectionary markets. This is particularly true for African 
countries. We did not attempt to model this aspect of the groundnut market, however our 
qualitative assessment of the groundnut market made this point clearly. Currently, the 
opportunities and rewards induced by the expansion of the edible groundnut exports market are 
eluding African producers to a large extent because of these quality issues. 
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ANNEX.  
I- Unit Root and Co-Integration Tests for Edible and Groundnut Oil International Prices 
Table A1. ADF Unit Root Test, Edible Groundnut Prices, Period 1970-81: 
ADF Test Statistic   0.314357   1% Critical Value*  -4.3260 
     5% Critical Value  -3.2195 
     10% Critical Value  -2.7557 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
 
Table A2. ADF Unit Root Test, Groundnut oil Prices, 1970-81: 
ADF Test Statistic  -2.588595   1% Critical Value*  -4.3260 
     5% Critical Value  -3.2195 
     10% Critical Value  -2.7557 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
 
Table A3. Johansen Co-integration Tests, Edible Groundnut and Groundnut Oil World Prices, 
1970-81 
Date: 12/01/02 Time: 12:33 
Sample(adjusted): 1970 1981 
Included observations: 12 after adjusting endpoints 
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend (restricted) 
Series: EDIBLEGR GROIL  
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test 
Hypothesized    Trace  5 Percent  1 Percent 
No. of CE(s)  Eigenvalue  Statistic  Critical Value  Critical Value 
None   0.673526   16.94914   25.32   30.45 
At most 1   0.437582   5.755101   12.25   16.26 
 *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level 
 Trace test indicates no cointegration at both 5% and 1% levels 
Hypothesized    Max-Eigen  5 Percent  1 Percent 
No. of CE(s)  Eigenvalue  Statistic  Critical Value  Critical Value 
None   0.673526   11.19404   18.96   23.65 
At most 1   0.437582   5.755101   12.25   16.26 
 *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level 
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates no cointegration at both 5% and 1% levels 
Table A4. Unit Root Test, Edible Groundnut Prices, Period 1981-2000 
ADF Test Statistic  -3.220154   1% Critical Value*  -3.8067 
     5% Critical Value  -3.0199 
     10% Critical Value  -2.6502 
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Table A5. Unit Root Test, Groundnut Oil Prices, Period 1981-2000 
ADF Test Statistic  -4.142213   1% Critical Value*  -3.8067 
     5% Critical Value  -3.0199 
     10% Critical Value  -2.6502 
*MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
 
II- Granger-Causality Test 
Do Senegalese Exports Granger-Cause Groundnut World Oil Price? 
DLOGEXP = First Difference of the Log of Senegalese Exports 
DLOGINTPR = First Difference of the Log of International Groundnut Oil Prices 
The test strongly indicates that Senegal’s groundnut oil export granger-cause international price 
while the reverse is not true. 
 
Table A6. Granger-Causality Test Between Senegalese Groundnut Oil Exports and World 
Prices of Groundnut oil 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 02/27/03 Time: 17:00 
Sample: 1961 2001 
Lags: 2 
 Null Hypothesis:  Obs  F-Statistic  Probability 
 DLOGINTPR does not Granger Cause DLOGEXP  37   0.02753   0.97287 
 DLOGEXP does not Granger Cause DLOGINTPR   7.43861   0.00222 
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